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Abstract [word count: 117] 
This paper considers the psychology of risk perception in worry about crime. A survey-
based study replicates a long-standing finding that perceptions of the likelihood of 
criminal victimization predict levels of fear of crime. But perceived control and perceived 
consequence also play two roles: (a) each predicts perceived likelihood; and (b) each 
moderates the relationship between perceived likelihood and worry about crime. Public 
perceptions of control and consequence thus drive what Mark Warr defines as ‘sensitivity 
to risk.’ When individuals perceive crime to be especially serious in its personal impact, 
and when individuals perceive that they have little personal control over the victimization 
event occurring, a lower level of perceived likelihood is needed to stimulate worry about 
crime.  
 
Key words: Fear of crime; risk perception; sensitivity to risk; personal vulnerability; 
probability insensitivity. 
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Beginning an often cited paper on a somewhat plaintive note, Warr & Stafford (1983) argued 
that one of the most disappointing features of research into the fear of crime was the lack of 
investigation into so-called ‘proximate causes of fear’ (meaning public perceptions of both 
the likelihood and consequence of criminal victimization). Complicating the ascription of 
irrationality when levels of fear outweigh levels of statistically estimated risk, Warr’s (1987) 
‘sensitivity to risk’ model predicts that the influence of perceived likelihood on fear is 
moderated by perceptions of crime seriousness. Warr found empirical support for the 
hypothesis that when people judged a crime to be especially serious, a lower level of 
perceived likelihood was needed to stimulate some level of personal fear. Individuals were 
more ‘sensitive’ to a given level of perceived likelihood when they viewed the crime to be 
especially serious in nature and consequence. 
In a more recent study Chadee et al. (2007) considered some elements of the sensitivity 
to risk model. Yet rather than looking at the pivotal role of perceived seriousness of crime, the 
authors instead speculated on the utility of an extensive body of psychological research into 
judgments under uncertainty. When judging the likelihood of uncertain events, people often 
employ cognitive heuristics or ‘rules of thumb’ rather than follow principles of probability 
theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973).i One of these ‘rules of thumb’ – the availability heuristic 
– predicts that the size of a class tends to be judged by the ease with which instances of it can be 
retrieved from memory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Applied to fear of crime, the availability 
heuristic may help explain why people tend to over-estimate the probability of criminal 
victimization, and particularly over-estimate the frequency of rare, spectacular and easily 
imaginable events (Warr, 1980). People substitute a relatively difficult question (how likely is it 
that I will become a victim of a particular crime?) with a relatively easy question (how easy can 
I imagine becoming a victim of a particular crime?). 
The findings of a London-based survey extend Warr’s model of risk sensitivity in two 
ways. First, when respondents judged crime to be especially uncontrollable, and when they 
judged crime to be especially serious in its consequence, a lower level of perceived likelihood 
was needed to stimulate relatively frequent worry about crime. Perceptions of consequence and 
control thus interacted with perceptions of likelihood to predict levels of worry about crime in 
the sample. Second, respondents tended to see victimization as likely when they saw the 
consequences to be severe and the event to be difficult to control. The availability heuristic 
predicts that vivid and easily accessible mental imagery (which in the current context may 
involve mental representations of highly uncontrollable, unpredictable and consequential 
crimes) shapes perceptions of the likelihood of a given risk. The extended model of risk 
sensitivity hopes to incorporate notions of vulnerability and circulating representations of risk 
into a more powerful framework on the dynamics of worry about crime. 
 
FEAR OF CRIME AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RISK  
The psychology of risk is an under-researched area in the fear of crime, yet insights can provide 
an important complement to the most extensive body of evidence: public perceptions of 
neighborhood breakdown and stability. Numerous studies have found that public concerns 
about local disorder, social cohesion and collective efficacy predict fear of crime (e.g. Ferraro, 
1995; Perkins & Taylor, 1996; Jackson, 2004; and Wyant, 2008; for reviews see Hale, 1996; 
Farrall et al., 2009). Such work suggests that citizens link the risk of crime with levels of moral 
consensus, social order and collective efficacy. If ‘day-to-day’ issues (‘young people hanging 
around’, ‘poor community spirit’, ‘low levels of trust and cohesion’) generate information about 
risk (Ferraro, 1995) and a sense of unease in one’s environment (cf. Goffman, 1971; Warr, 
1990; Tulloch, 2003), then fear of crime emerges as a social indicator of public concerns over 
neighborhood breakdown, societal cohesion, moral consensus, and the pace and direction of 
social change (Jackson, 2006). Citizens may be expressing through the language of ‘fear’ and 
‘crime’ a wealth of anxieties about social fragmentation, the loss of moral authority, and the 
crumbling of interpersonal trust, daily civility and social capital (Girling et al., 2000).  
To this framework we might add the mechanisms that underpin subjective risk 
assessment. Consider Warr’s (1987) ‘sensitivity to risk’ model. Simple yet powerful (Figure 1, 
left box), at its most basic the model describes the relationship between perceived risk (defined 
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by Warr as the perceived likelihood of victimization and measured by Warr on a scale from 0 to 
10) and fear (measured by Warr via asking individuals how ‘afraid’ they are of falling victim on 
a scale from 0 to 10). Assuming a linear relationship between perceived risk and fear, a 
regression line captures the three basic elements: the point at which a given level of perceived 
risk stimulates a non-zero level of fear (threshold); the rate at which fear increases with 
perceived risk (slope); and the maximum level of fear that can be produced (maximum fear). 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
According to the sensitivity to risk model the threshold and the slope (and therefore 
the maximum) can vary according to the type of crime and how serious individuals judge that 
crime to be (Warr, 1987). The threshold and slope can also vary according to social group. 
Study after study has shown that women tend to report higher levels than men of fear of 
falling victim of crimes such as physical attack or mugging (for general reviews of fear of 
crime literature, see Hale, 1996, and Farrall et al., 2009). Warr (1985) found that women 
tended to see crimes as more serious than men partly because they tended to view certain 
crimes as a prelude to more serious crimes (so-called ‘perceptually contemporaneous 
offenses,’ since one event is judged to covary with another event). This, he argued, explained 
why the intercept in the regression equation was often higher (depending on the type of 
crime) for females than it was for males. 
Warr (1987) subsequently found that both the threshold and the slope for the linear 
relationship between perceived likelihood and fear differed in a predictable way according to 
the average perceived seriousness of the crime in question. Figure 1 (right box) summarizes 
some of the data, where six regression lines model the linear relationship between fear and 
perceived likelihood for each of six criminal offences. As one moves from the bottom line to 
the top line so this offence was judged by respondents to be of an increasingly serious nature. 
In most cases the same level of perceived likelihood was unlikely to result in the same 
amount of fear, with Warr (1987) explaining this in part by differential perception of the 
seriousness of crime.ii 
The risk sensitivity model thus suggests (a) that some crimes are typically seen as more 
serious than other crimes, (b) that different people can come to different conclusions about the 
same crime, and (c) that the interaction of individual levels of perceived seriousness and 
perceived likelihood in part generates the intensity of subsequent emotional response. Some 
individuals may associate a type of crime with especially serious consequences because they 
feel particularly vulnerable to the criminal event. They might, for example, associate burglary 
with violence in part because they lack the ability to defend themselves, and believe they could 
be a target of sexual assault in such a situation. But crucially, it is the subjective sense of 
seriousness and consequence that then leads to a subsequently heightened fear response, even 
when perceived probabilities are small, precisely because susceptibility and threat is believed to 
be high (cf. Jackson, 2009). 
Yet the mass media might also play a role in risk sensitivity. The media are the prime 
source of information about the extent, nature and seriousness of crime in society. The most 
dramatic media reports are outliers: shocking but rare criminal events (cf. Stapel & Veltheuijser, 
1996; van Zomeren & Lodewijkx, 2009). An individual might, for instance, associate burglary 
with violence in part because he or she receives striking reports of especially serious burglaries 
from the newspapers, television and other media. Circulating images of crime and risk may thus 
lead to widespread beliefs that the especially serious nature of crimes. If many people develop 
their own sense of risk shaped by common imagery of particularly frightening crimes, then it 
may not be very surprising that many people worry about crime. By hearing about specific 
events of crime that are brought home in a very vivid way – ‘as if it could happen to me’ – 
people may then develop these personalized representations of the risk of crime, with all the 
attendant sense of high consequence, loss of control, and sense of likelihood (Jackson, 2006). 
Recall, however, that Warr (1985) found significant variation in perceptions of the 
seriousness of crime. Extending this to the impact of the mass media, people may selectively 
expose themselves to information (Freedman & Sears, 1965). Already fearful of crime – and 
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already feeling vulnerable – they actively seek out information. The resulting effect on public 
perceptions of risk may additionally depend on the nature and extent of local crime reports, with 
people paying particular attention to reports that are according to Koomen et al. (2000: 923): 
‘…sensational and self-relevant presentations of crime that are local, random, and sensational.’ 
Heath (1984: 264) argues that sensational crimes ‘achieve their spine-chilling quality from 
either severe violations of social norms or from violations of deeply engrained social norms.’ 
She found that reports of so-called ‘sensational’ crimes were associated with higher fear so long 
as the incidents were local (cf. Liska & Baccaglini, 1990), while crime reports that contained no 
information about the motive of the crime aroused more fear than if a motive was included. In 
Stapel & Velthuihsen’s (1996) study stronger responses were also elicited when the victim was 
similar to the participant.  
 
Extending the risk sensitivity model 
The objective of this paper is, then, to uncover some of the basic dynamics of risk perception in 
worry about crime. It is for future research to explore the characteristics of sensational and self-
relevant crime reports, to integrate an account of circulating representations of risk into the 
broader explanatory framework (cf. Jackson, 2008). The present task is more modest. Extending 
Warr’s work on risk sensitivity in two directions, the first contribution is to examine dual 
interaction effects in which perceived control and perceived consequence each alter the 
observed relationship between perceived likelihood and worry about crime (Figure 2). When 
people judge crime to be especially serious in its personal effect, and when they feel they have 
little personal control over its occurrence, a lower level of perceived likelihood may be needed 
to predict a relatively frequent pattern of worry. Put another way, perceived likelihood becomes 
more important in the production of emotional response when personal consequence is seen to 
be especially high and when personal control is seen to be especially low. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
There are parallels here to the ‘psychometric paradigm’ in risk perception research 
(Slovic, 2000), which shows that people are attune not just to the likelihood of a risk and the 
number of lives at stake, but also to qualitatively distinctive factors including whether a risk is 
seen to be catastrophic or ‘dreaded’ and a risk is seen to be uncontrollable, familiar and 
involuntarily incurred. The current study captures two elements at the heart of the 
psychometric paradigm in risk perception research – perception of consequence and 
perception of control – but it specifies them within a model of cognitive and affective 
appraisals of the risk of criminal victimization. The first two hypotheses are, more precisely, 
that worry emerges when people view the risk of crime to be especially uncontrollable and 
especially consequential in its personal impact, in part because only a relatively low level of 
perceived likelihood is needed to stimulate emotional response. 
The second contribution relates to the effect of perceived consequence on perceived 
likelihood and perceived control on perceived likelihood. Consistent with work on the 
availability heuristic, the third and fourth hypotheses are that viewing crime as highly 
consequential and highly uncontrollable will be associated with judging victimization to be 
especially likely. When people feel a relatively high level of control over risk, they may take 
adequate precautions, have good security provisions, feel able to ‘read’ the environment for 
signs of trouble, and be able to deal with any encounters if they were to occur. There is a good 
deal of evidence from psychological research that high perceived control is associated with 
low perceived likelihood in various domains of risk perception (e.g. Hoorens & Buunk, 
1993). Yet, when people associate victimization with particularly dramatic and consequential 
events, and when people see specific criminal acts as especially uncontrollable and 
unpredictable, they may also find it easier to imagine themselves becoming a victim, since 
their mental imagery of crime involves emotionally-arresting characteristics and scenarios. 
The rationale for the third and fourth hypotheses is as follows. Individuals who see 
victimization as difficult to control and especially strong in its impact are also expected to 
hold mental representations of risk that include dramatic and emotionally relevant imagery. 
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Nisbett and Ross (1980: 45) suggest that vividness is core to the availability of information, 
and that vivid information is typically: ‘(a) emotionally interesting, (b) concrete and imagery 
provoking, and (c) proximate in a sensory, temporal, or spatial way.’ Thus, a starting premise 
of this study is that events which are seen to be highly serious and extremely difficult to 
control will be more likely to be cognitively represented using vivid and emotionally relevant 
imagery. Such imagery will then typically lead to heightened cognitive availability, it is 




Warr’s model predicts that perceived likelihood of victimization will be more strongly 
associated with fear of victimization among those people who judge the seriousness of crime 
to be high (compared to those people who judge the serious of crime to be low). His work 
thus hinges on a statistical interaction in which perceived seriousness ‘moderates’ (i.e. 
increases or decreases) the strength of the relationship between perceived likelihood and 
worry about crime. This study tests four hypotheses by way of contribution: 
 
H1 Perceived consequence will moderate the association between perceived likelihood 
and worry about crime;  
H2 Perceived control will moderate the association between perceived likelihood and 
worry about crime;  
H3 Perceived likelihood will be positively associated with perceived consequence; 
and, 
H4 Perceived likelihood will be negatively associated with perceived control.  
Participants 
As with Warr’s work, observational data are used to test the core propositions. Data were 
collected from a postal survey of residents of two neighbouring areas of London. A pure 
random probability sample of 1,800 registered voters was drawn from the UK Electoral 
Register. Respondents were sent a questionnaire, and if this was not returned within 2 weeks, 
a reminder letter (including duplicate questionnaire) followed. A raffle was also carried out 
(three prizes of £50, £25 and £10). The achieved response rate was 27% (479 completed 
questionnaires), with 33% in the first area (299 in Victoria Gardens) and 20% in the second 
(180 in Katherine House).iii 
 Victoria Gardens is a wealthy and well-kept suburb with predominantly white and 
middle-class residents.iv According to local police statistics, Victoria Gardens has low 
personal crime rates but a relatively high incidence of car crime. Katharine House is a high-
rise, high-density, local authority housing estate with relatively high levels of personal crime 
and a significant amount of incivilities such as graffiti and young people causing noise and 
harassment. Katharine House is also an area with a good proportion of residents from low-
income brackets and a diverse ethnic mix.  
Yet the area in which respondents live is not considered important in this study, 
indeed the choice to survey these two neighborhoods was motivated by another research 
question. We know that perceptions of neighborhood breakdown and stability predict 
perceptions of risk (Ferraro, 1995; Farrall et al., 2009). Where people live may be important 
in explaining people’s perceptions of social cohesion and decline that then shape perceived 
risk, although people can come to quite different conclusions about the same environmental 
stimuli (Carvahlo & Lewis, 2003; Sampson & Raudenbush, 2004; Jackson, 2004; Franzini et 
al., 2008). In the current study it may be that Katharine House contains a greater 
preponderance of social and physical cues. Observers in Katharine House may then relate the 
presence of disorderly cues to a significant risk of victimisation, and this might help explain 
overall area differences in worry about crime. But the target here in this study is the inter-
relationships underpinning worry about crime and public perceptions of likelihood, control 
and consequence. Crucially, the psychological mechanisms linking cognitive appraisals of 
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risk to emotional responses are assumed not to differ systematically among individuals who 
live in the two neighbouring London areas.  
 
Measures 
To measure worry about crime, respondents were asked how often (if at all) they had worried 
about becoming a victim of each of seven crimes while in their neighborhood.v In order to get 
more accurate self-reports, the time-period in question was specified to be the past month 
(Jackson, 2005). The seven crimes were: being attacked by a stranger in the street; being 
robbed or mugged in the street; being harassed, threatened or verbally abused in the street; 
being pick-pocketed or having something stolen in a non-violent manner; having the home or 
property vandalised or defaced; having someone break into the home whilst the inhabitants 
were there; and having someone break into the home whilst the inhabitants were away. 
Response alternatives were: ‘not once in the last month’; ‘once or twice in the past month’; 
‘once or twice in the past week’; and ‘every day.’ 
Perceived likelihood was measured by asking respondents how likely they thought it 
was that they would fall victim of each of the seven crimes in their area (over the next 12 
months). Three measurement strategies are used to elicit such subjective probabilities. The 
first is to generate numeric expressions of probability or odds; one might, for example, ask 
respondents whether the pereived probability is 0.2 or 0.4 or 0.6, and so forth. The second is 
to use some kind of visual representation. One might for example provide a line labelled at 
the end points as ‘probability of zero’ and ‘probability of one’ and ask respondents to draw a 
cross between these two points that represents their own estimated probability.vi Generating 
verbal expressions of uncertainty is the third option, and the one taken in the present study 
with a seven-point scale labelled at the endpoints: 1 = definitely not going to happen and 7 = 
certain to happen.  
On perceived consequence, respondents were asked how much they thought their 
lives would be affected by a typical instance of each of the categories of criminal 
victimization, with a seven-point scale labelled at the endpoints (1 = not at all and 7 = to a 
very great extent). Warr’s (1987) study into risk sensitivity asked individuals how serious a 
given crime was. In making such a judgment it is conceivable that people draw on a number 
of issues including the impact on victims and society and the degree of moral culpability and 
transgression involved in the act (Warr, 1989; cf. Rosenmerkel, 2001, and Alter et al., 
2007).vii The current study measures perceptions of the seriousness of the personal impact of 
victimization (Jackson, 2009), which is assumed to invoke respondents’ ability to cope with 
the consequences, but also respondents’ expectations about the nature and severity of 
representative instances of various criminal acts. 
Perceived control was measured by asking respondents whether they felt able to 
control whether they became a victim of various crimes in their area. A seven-point scale was 
used with only the endpoints labelled 1 = not at all;  and 7 = to a very great extent. Perceived 
control over the risk of crime is assumed to comprise two things. The first is personal self-
efficacy, i.e. feeling able to exert control over falling victim of crime, including being able to 
physically defend oneself and take appropriate precautions to keep safe. The second is public 
beliefs about the nature and characteristics of particular crime, e.g. whether a crime is seen to 
be especially unpredictable, involving indiscriminate targeting, being mobile, volatile, with 
obscure motivation.viii  
 
Descriptive statistics 
Tables 1 and 2 provide summary statistics for the single indicators of each of the four central 
constructs (worry about crime, perceived likelihood, perceived consequence and perceived 
control). Inspection of the top-line findings showed that the majority of the sample had not 
worried once in the past month, whether about property crime (burglary and vandalism) or 
personal crime (non-violent theft, physical attack by a stranger, harassment, and robbery). 
Somewhere between 4% and 13% of the sample reported having worried ‘everyday’ about 
falling victim of each crime. These are frequency levels consistent with British Crime Survey 
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estimates of the frequency of worry across England and Wales (Gray et al., 2008; Farrall et 
al., 2009). 
 
INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 2 shows mean levels of perceived likelihood over the next 12 months (ranging 
from 2.62 for physical attack to 3.31 for burglary while the inhabitants are not at home), 
where 1 = ‘definitely not going to happen’ and 7 = ‘certain to happen.’ All the variables had a 
positively skewed distribution, with longer right tails found in the more serious crimes of 
burglary while the inhabitants are at home, physical attack in the street by a stranger, and 
being robbed in the street. For the same crimes there was also positive kurtosis, indicating a 
more distinct peak near the mean, a more rapid decline, and larger tails compared to the other 
crime categories. 
Turning to the perceived consequence measures, the mean ranged from 4.91 (non-
violent theft) to 6.23 (burglary while the inhabitants are at home) on a scale ranging from 1 to 
7 (where 1 = not at all and 7 = to a very great extent). All the items were negatively skewed, 
with the longer left tails being found in the variables relating to the more serious crimes 
(burglary while the inhabitants are at home, physical attack in the street by a stranger, and 
being robbed in the street). This suggests agreement among the respondents about the severity 
of impact of these crimes (backed up by the same three crimes having high and positive 
kurtosis statistics). 
Finally, with the perceived control measures, the mean ranged from 3.15 (vandalism) 
to 4.68 (burglary while the inhabitants are at home) on a scale from 1 to 7 (where 1 = not at 
all and 7 = to a very great extent). There were relatively low levels of skewness in the 
distribution of each variable. All the kurtosis statistics were negative, suggesting a flat top 
near the mean rather than a sharp peak.  
 
Statistical modelling  
The first step of analysis was to examine the relationship between perceived likelihood and 
worry about crime, and particularly to test a moderating effect of perceived consequence 
(hypothesis 1) and of perceived control (hypothesis 2). All variables were weighted factor 
scores that were rescaled to range from 0 to 10.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 3 shows the results of three linear regression models, with the frequency of 
worry about personal crime specified in each model as the response variable. Perceived 
control and perceived likelihood both predicted levels of worry about personal crime, but 
perceived consequence did not (Model I). When adding the first interaction effect to the 
model (where the statistical effect of perceived likelihood on worry can differ according to 
levels of perceived consequence), the interaction term was found to be statistically significant. 
Supporting hypothesis 1, the estimated average statistical effect of perceived likelihood on 
worry increased as perceived consequence increased. Figure 3 provides a more accessible 
visualisation of the interaction effects relating to personal crime. Recall that the single 
indicators of perceived consequence were negatively skewed. The mean of the index was 
around 8 and the maximum was 10, and Figure 3 (top graphic) shows the fitted line 
(representing the estimated relationship between worry and perceived likelihood) where the 
perceived consequence index is 4, 6, 8 and 10. One can see that the slope of perceived 
likelihood increased as levels of perceived consequence increased. Among individuals who 
saw the personal consequences of victimization to be especially high, a lower level of 
perceived likelihood was needed to predict frequent worry about crime. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
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A second interaction effect was then added between perceived likelihood and 
perceived control. Again this was statistically significant. As feelings of perceived control 
decreased, so the estimated average statistical effect of perceived likelihood on worry 
decreased. This supports hypothesis 2. Because the perceived control index had a normal 
distribution, fitted lines were provided for 0, 2, 4, 6, 8 and 10. Figure 3 (bottom graphic) 
shows that the slope of perceived likelihood increased as perceived control decreases.  
Worry about property crime was also examined, although for reasons of brevity full 
findings are not presented. But to summarize: as with personal crime, the interaction effects 
were statistically significant, and the effect of perceived likelihood on worry increased as 
perceived control decreased and as perceived consequence increased.  
To test the third and fourth hypotheses, structural equation modelling (using MPlus 
5.2 and treating the indicators as ordinal-level variables) was used to estimate regression 
paths between the relevant latent variables; first for personal crime, and second for property 
crime (Figure 4). This technique has the advantage of allowing a number of regression 
equations to be simultaneously estimated, meaning that paths to worry can also be included in 
the statistical model. However, estimating interaction effects in structural equation modelling 
is a complex (and controversial) task, so interactions were not included here. Given that the 
standard regression techniques above established interaction effects (Table 4), the parameter 
estimates relating to likelihood predicting worry should be interpreted as only the average 
effect of likelihood across all levels of (separately) perceived control and perceived 
consequence. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Starting with personal crime, the fit of the model was good according to approximate 
fit indices (RMSEA=0.08, CFI=0.97, TLI=0.99) and not good according to exact fit statistics 
(χ2=173, 42 df, ρ<.001), although it is customary to focus on approximate fit indices (Hu & 
Bentler, 1999). Because no structural paths were constrained, the fit statistics relate to the test 
of the measurement models. This indicates that the scales have adequate reliability, and that 
the structure of the measurement model had some validity. This conclusion is strengthened by 
the fact that the factor loadings (validity coefficients) of the worry indicators were all 
statistically significant and of considerable magnitude (pick-pocket, λ=0.78; physical attack, 
λ=0.90; harassment, λ=0.86; and street robbery, λ=0.93), as were the factor loadings of the 
perceived likelihood indicators (pick-pocket, λ=0.77; physical attack, λ=0.92; harassment, 
λ=0.85; and street robbery, λ=0.89), the perceived consequence indicators (pick-pocket, 
λ=0.79; physical attack, λ=0.89; harassment, λ=0.84; and street robbery, λ=0.86) and the 
perceived control indicators (pick-pocket, λ=0.75; physical attack, λ=0.91; harassment, 
λ=0.85; and street robbery, λ=0.91). 
All the coefficients relating to structural paths were statistically significant, apart 
from the path of perceived consequence to worry about personal crime. Replicating the results 
from Model I (Table 3), perceived likelihood was a strong predictor of worry and perceived 
control was a moderate predictor of worry. Higher expected values of worry were associated 
with judging likelihood of victimization to be high and personal control over the risk to be 
low. Moreover, both perceived control and perceived consequence were moderate predictors 
of perceived likelihood. The more an individual saw the consequence to be severe and the 
more an individual saw control to be low, the higher the expected value of perceived 
likelihood. 
For property crime, the fit of the model was good according to approximate fit indices 
(RMSEA=0.09, CFI=0.96, TLI=0.96) but not good in terms of exact fit (χ2=117, 25 df, 
ρ<.001). In fact a respectable fit was only achieved by allowing error terms to covary between 
each pair of the ‘burglary in’ and ‘burglary out’ indicators. This is justified by respect to 
measurement error, since respondents can plausibly have different expectations about 
burglary. As with personal crime, the factor loadings of the various indicators were also all 
statistically significant and of considerable magnitude. All the coefficients relating to 
structural paths were statistically significant, apart from the one relating to the path between 
 10 
perceived consequence and worry about property crime. As with personal crime, perceived 
likelihood was a strong predictor and perceived control was a moderate predictor of worry 
about property crime. Again, higher expected values of worry were associated with judging 
likelihood of victimization to be high and personal control over the risk to be low. Finally, 
both perceived control and perceived consequence were moderate predictors of perceived 
likelihood: the more an individual saw the consequence to be severe, and the more an 
individual saw the control to be low, the higher the expected value of perceived likelihood. 
 
DISCUSSION 
The findings of this study contribute to our understanding of the psychology of risk in worry 
about crime. The utility of differentiating between perceived likelihood, consequence and 
control is demonstrated. While perceived likelihood was the judgment that most strongly 
predicted levels of worry about crime, perceived control and perceived consequence each had 
three roles to play. First, each predicted perceived likelihood. Second, each predicted worry 
(with the exception of perceived consequence). Third, each moderated the strength of the 
association between perceived likelihood and the frequency of worry. Warr (1987) found that 
among people who judged crime to be especially serious, a lower level of perceived 
likelihood was needed to stimulate a given level of personal fear. He argued that such 
individuals were thus more ‘sensitive’ to a given level of perceived likelihood: 
 
‘…the perceived seriousness of an offense affects fear by altering the functional 
relation between fear and perceived risk (i.e., sensitivity to risk). Sensitivity to 
risk in turn affects fear by determining the “output” of fear produced by a given 
“input” of perceived risk.’ (Warr, 1987: 40). 
 
The current investigation extends this finding. The greater the perceived consequence and the 
lower the perceived control, the stronger the observed association between perceived 
likelihood and worry about crime. People worried even when they viewed victimization to be 
relatively unlikely, so long as they saw the personal impact of the event to be high and/or 
their personal control to be low.  
To explain why perceived control and perceived consequence might be associated with 
perceived likelihood, we can draw on research from cognitive psychology into why people 
routinely over-estimate the probability of dramatic and salient events. There is a good deal of 
evidence from the psychological literature that high perceived control predicts low perceived 
likelihood (see Skinner, 1996, for a review of the concept of perceived control). But the 
availability heuristic states that people judge the probability of an event partly on the ease with 
which they can imagine the event. Applied to worry about crime, cognitive representations of 
vivid and dramatic crimes may be characterised in specific mental models of risk as especially 
uncontrollable events with highly serious consequences. Crucially, respondents in the study 
may have judged the likelihood to be relatively high partly because they found it relatively easy 
to personally imagine criminal acts and criminal events. Individuals might be substituting a 
difficult question (how likely is it …?) with an easy question (can I picture the event …?). 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH 
This paper hopes to stimulate a program of psychological research into perception and the fear 
of crime. Citizens generate their own subjective risk estimates, which comprise the interplay 
between perceived consequence, likelihood and control. Combined with the fact that the media 
routinely report rare but sensational criminal events, this may explain why many people worry 
about crime and, indeed, why some individuals worry more than other individuals (through 
selective information seeking and prior feelings of personal vulnerability). Threats that seem 
difficult to detect, that involve indiscriminate targeting, that are mobile, volatile and with 
obscure motivation – all these may be especially worry or fear provoking, in part because of two 
processes. The first is cognitive availability, since vivid social representations of crime may 
elevate the perceived likelihood of that event occurring. The second is through perceptions of 
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powerlessness and severe consequence interacting with perceived likelihood to stimulate 
relatively frequent emotional response. 
There are parallels here to ‘probability neglect’ in risk perception research (Sunstein, 
2003; Loewenstein et al., 2001; Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001). Probability neglect predicts that 
when strong emotions are involved, people focus on the badness of the outcome rather than 
on the probability that the outcome will occur. Sunstein (2003) argues that probability neglect 
helps explain excessive public reactions to low-probability risks of catastrophe such as 
terrorist attacks. People who are already fearful of terrorism will focus less on the sense of 
probability and more on the actual event. Vivid imagery of the event crowds out a more 
dispassionate sense of statistical chance. And while one may ask why someone is fearful in 
the first place, probability neglect does suggest a simple mechanism by which fear is 
maintained.  
On first glance the two notions – of risk sensitivity and probability neglect – diverge. 
We are ‘sensitive’ to perceived likelihood but we are also ‘neglectful’ of perceived likelihood. 
Yet in this observational study the empirical implications of the two models are actually 
identical. It is just that the two underlying psychological processes are different. In both cases 
people with high levels of emotion could view the likelihood to be relatively low when the 
consequence is seen to be high. On the one hand, probability neglect states that this is because 
emotion crowds out rational assessments of likelihood, so perceived consequence takes over. 
On the other hand, risk sensitivity suggests that once individuals associate a risk with high 
personal consequence and low personal control, only a relatively small level of perceived 
likelihood is needed to elicit a strong emotional response.  
The real issue here is what would happen to individuals for whom the perceived 
likelihood of victimization increases over time. Would (for example) the manipulation of 
perceived likelihood lead to large shifts in emotion, as predicted by the risk sensitivity model? 
Or would heightened perceived likelihood lead to weak shifts in emotion, as predicted by the 
probability neglect model? Observational data cannot be the arbiter here; experimental studies 
exert greater control and power to infer. If we are to integrate into existing explanations some 
core aspects of the psychology of risk, future experimental work is best placed to answer 
questions such as these, to help uncover some of the dynamics and mechanisms underpinning 
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TABLE 1 Descriptive statistics of the sample 
 




twice in the 
past month 
Once or 
twice in the 
past week 
Everyday Row % 
Burglary (out of the home) 211 (46%) 163 (35%) 28 (6%) 60 (13%) 100% 
Burglary (in the home) 336 (72%) 85 (18%) 25 (5%) 19 (4%) 100% 
Vandalism etc. 261 (57%) 113 (25%) 40 (9%) 46 (10%) 100% 
Non-violent theft 323 (70%) 96 (21%) 21 (5%) 23 (5%) 100% 
Physical attack 346 (75%) 69 (15%) 25 (5%) 24 (5%) 100% 
Harassment 320 (69%) 85 (18%)| 28 (6%) 29 (6%) 100% 
Robbery 323 (70%) 96 (21%) 19 (4%) 24 (5%) 100% 
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TABLE 2 Descriptive statistics of the sample 
Variables M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
How likely do you think it is that you will fall victim of each of 
the following during the next twelve months? 1 = definitely not 
going to happen and 7 = certain to happen. 
    
Burglary while out of the home 3.31 1.46 0.40 -0.45 
Burglary while in the home 2.48 1.34 1.13 1.08 
Acts of vandalism / graffiti / damage to property 3.25 1.57 0.66 -0.31 
Being pick-pocketed and other non-violent theft 2.77 1.36 0.94 0.69 
Being physically attacked in the street by a stranger 2.62 1.32 1.11 1.01 
Being harassed, being threatened or verbally abused in the 
street 3.08 1.64 0.84 -0.19 
Being mugged and robbed 2.76 1.40 1.00 0.71 
To what extent do you think the experience of a typical instance 
of each of the following would affect your everyday life? 1 = not 
at all and 7 = to a very great extent.         
Burglary while out of the home 5.49 1.58 -1.12 0.53 
Burglary while in the home 6.23 1.38 -2.16 4.24 
Acts of vandalism / graffiti / damage to property 5.17 1.55 -0.47 -0.56 
Being pick-pocketed and other non-violent theft 4.91 1.60 -0.51 -0.51 
Being physically attacked in the street by a stranger 6.19 1.32 -2.03 3.96 
Being harassed, being threatened or verbally abused in the 
street 5.32 1.54 -0.91 0.23 
Being mugged and robbed 6.08 1.33 -1.88 3.57 
To what extent do you feel able to control whether or not you 
become of victim of the following? 1 = not at all;  and 7 = to a 
very great extent.           
Burglary while out of the home 3.95 1.93 -0.06 -1.20 
Burglary while in the home 4.68 1.91 -0.48 -0.95 
Acts of vandalism / graffiti / damage to property 3.15 1.86 0.47 -0.97 
Being pick-pocketed and other non-violent theft 4.08 1.86 -0.16 -1.06 
Being physically attacked in the street by a stranger 3.57 1.86 0.20 -1.08 
Being harassed, being threatened or verbally abused in the 
street 3.45 1.79 0.28 -0.95 











TABLE 3 Risk sensitivity: Worry about personal crime and the perception of 
risk  
Model Variable 
(I) (II) (III) 
 
B CI B CI B CI 
Perceived likelihood  
(high values = high likelihood) 0.53*** 0.43, 0.63 -0.27 -0.72, 0.19 0.76*** 0.61, 0.90 
Perceived control 
(high values = high levels of control) -0.16*** -0.23, -0.08 -0.15*** -0.22, -0.08 0.01 -0.10, 0.11 
Perceived consequence  
(high values = serious imagined 
consequences) 
0.07 -0.03, 0.17 0.09 -0.23, 0.04 0.07 -0.02, 0.17 
Interaction between perceived likelihood 
and perceived consequence    0.09*** 0.04, 0.14   
Interaction between perceived likelihood 
and perceived control     -0.06*** -0.08, -0.03 
(Constant) 0.13  1.48  -0.61  
R2 0.31  0.33  0.34  
* statistically significant at the 5% level, ** statistically significant at the 1% level, *** statistically significant at 
the 0.1% level 
B = estimated partial regression coefficient; CI = 95% confidence interval  



















         Basic elements of Warr’s (1987: 31)             Adapted from Warr (1987: 38)  
                  sensitivity to risk model                               
NB. Each line represents the relationship 
between perceived risk and fear for one of 
eight different offence types. Working 
upwards from begging to rape, each crime was 
judged to be more serious than the previous 
crime by respondents in the study. 
 
 





























having someone break into the home 
while someone is in the house 
being beaten up by a stranger 
 
having strangers loiter near your  
home late at night 





Worry about falling 
victim of crime 
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 Figure 3: Sensitivity to risk in worry about personal crime 
The moderating role of perceived consequence
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The moderating role of perceived control 
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Control=0 Control=2 Control=4 (mean)
Control=6 Control=8 Control=10
 
NB: the perceived consequence variable is skewed, with a mean of around 8, a maximum of 10, and a long tail towards 0 (less 
than 5% of the sample had a score of below 4). 
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Structural equation modelling with categorical factor indicators (MPlus 5.2) 
Measurement models not shown 
Standardized coefficients  
Chi-square=173, 42 df; ρ <.001 
RMSEA=0.08; CFI=0.97; TLI=0.99 



























Structural equation modelling with categorical factor indicators (MPlus 5.2) 
Measurement models not shown 
Standardized coefficients  
Chi-square=117, 25 df; ρ <.001 
RMSEA=0.09; CFI=0.96; TLI=0.96 





                                                 
i
 According to Tversky & Kahneman (1973), cognitive heuristics are ‘highly economical and usually effective,’ 
but they can also ‘lead to systematic and predictable errors.’ For discussion see Gigerenzer (2000). 
ii
 More recent research has shown that judgments of seriousness are composed of evaluations of the harmfulness of a 
crime and the wrongfulness of a crime (Warr, 1989; O’Connell & Whelan, 1996; Rosenmerkel, 2001; Alter et al., 
2007). Warr (1989) found that people tend to focus on one or the other evaluation, attending to the dominant feature 
of the crime. When crimes were seen as especially harmful, then the judgment of seriousness was heavily weighted by 
harmfulness. But when crimes were seen as especially wrong, then the judgment of seriousness was heavily weighted 
by wrongfulness. In a later study Alter et al. (2007) found that wrongfulness was dominant, however, although 
harmfulness was still a factor. 
iii
 The samples cannot be viewed as representative of the two areas. Yet one typically worries about the 
representativeness of a sample when one estimates more basic population attributes such as means or proportions. 
Relationships between constructs are arguably less susceptible to low response rates, and the relationships between 
threat appraisal, vulnerability and emotion (for example) are unlikely to be specific to whether one lives in one 
adjacent area of London or another.  
iv
 Victoria Gardens and Katherine House are pseudonyms. 
v
 These measures are assumed to produce a more accurate reflection of the everyday experience of fear of crime 
than standard measures such as ‘How safe do you feel walking alone in your area after dark?’ and ‘How afraid are 
you of being burgled?’. Warr (2000: 434) differentiates between those fears ‘aroused by an immediate danger, as 
when an individual is confronted by an armed attacker or is verbally threatened with harm’ and those anxieties 
about future or past events that result from an ‘anticipation of possible threats or in reaction to environmental cues 
(e.g. darkness, graffiti) that imply danger.’ He suggests that standards measures of ‘fear’ capture anxiety rather 
than fear. Other researchers have employed to good effect measures of the past frequency of worry about crime 
(Jackson, 2004, 2005; Gray et al., 2008; Farrall et al., 2009). The current study takes this lead, by focusing on past 
events of everyday worry, in order to more precisely measure specific previous instances of worry. 
vi
 Which is the best option for measuring the perceived likelihood of criminal victimization? Windschilt and Wells 
(1996) suggest that questions that use words or numbers to describe uncertainty encourage respondents to use one 
or two separate systems of reason: one based on associative, intuitive and automatic processes; the other on rule-
based, deliberate, controlled processes (cf. Sloman, 1996). One should therefore use words to describe probability 
when one assumes that individuals think about the given risk in one way, and use numbers to describe probability 
when one assumes that individuals think about the given risk in another way. The question for the current 
investigation is whether the risk of victimization is most often thought about using intuitive and non-rule based 
reasoning (if this is the case, then measures that employ verbal expressions of uncertainty are to be preferred) or in 
terms of actuarial and systematic terms (if this is the case, then measures that employ numeric expressions of 
uncertainty are to be preferred). Verbal expressions were chosen in this study because it is assumed that people 
think about the chances of victimization using intuitive and non-rule based reasoning, rather than numeric, formal 
and rule-based information processing. 
vii
 Warr (1989) found that where crimes are perceived be more wrong than harmful, then worry wrongfulness 
dominates the seriousness judgment, and vice versa: where crimes are perceived to be more harmful than wrong, 
then harmfulness dominates the seriousness judgment. 
viii
 It is for future study to investigate the extent to which perceived control consists of perceived self-efficacy and 
specific beliefs/representations of criminal acts. 
